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ABSTRACT
The spreading of unsubstantiated rumors on online social
networks (OSN) either unintentionally or intentionally (e.g.,
for political reasons or even trolling) can have serious con-
sequences such as in the recent case of rumors about Ebola
causing disruption to health-care workers. Here we show
that indicators aimed at quantifying information consump-
tion patterns might provide important insights about the
virality of false claims. In particular, we address the driv-
ing forces behind the popularity of contents by analyzing a
sample of 1.2M Facebook Italian users consuming different
(and opposite) types of information (science and conspir-
acy news). We show that users’ engagement across different
contents correlates with the number of friends having sim-
ilar consumption patterns (homophily), indicating the area
in the social network where certain types of contents are
more likely to spread. Then, we test diffusion patterns on
an external sample of 4,709 intentional satirical false claims
showing that neither the presence of hubs (structural proper-
ties) nor the most active users (influencers) are prevalent in
viral phenomena. Instead, we found out that in an environ-
ment where misinformation is pervasive, users’ aggregation
around shared beliefs may make the usual exposure to con-
spiracy stories (polarization) a determinant for the virality
of false information.
∗Corresponding author
General Terms
Misinformation, Virality, Attention Patterns
1. INTRODUCTION
The Web has become pervasive and digital technology per-
meates every aspect of daily life. Social interaction, health-
care activity, political engagement, and economic decision-
making are influenced by the digital hyperconnectivity [1–8].
Nowadays, everyone can produce and access a variety of in-
formation actively participating in the diffusion and rein-
forcement of narratives, by which we mean information co-
herent with a given worldview. Such a shift of paradigm in
the consumption of information has profoundly affected the
way people get informed [9–15]. However, the role of the
socio-technical systems in shaping the public opinion still
remains unclear. Indeed, the spreading of unsubstantiated
rumors, whether it is unintentional or intentional (e.g., for
political reasons or even trolling), could have serious con-
sequences; the World Economic Forum has listed massive
digital misinformation as one of the main risks for the mod-
ern society [16].
On online social networks, users discover and share infor-
mation with their friends and through cascades of reshares
information might reach a large number of individuals. Cas-
cades are rare [17], but are common on online social media
such as Facebook or Twitter [18–20]. Interesting is the pop-
ular case of Senator Cirenga’s [21,22] law proposing to fund
policy makers with 134 million of euros (10% of the Italian
GDP) in case of defeat in the political competition. This
was an intentional joke – the text of the post was explicitly
mentioning its provocative nature – that became popular
within online political activists to an extent that it has been
used as an argumentation in political debates [23]. The in-
formation overload mixed with users’ limited attention may
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facilitate the creation of urban legends.
Predicting the evolution of cascades is far from trivial [24].
In this work, we want to understand the driving forces be-
hind the popularity of contents accounting for the users in-
formation consumption patterns. To this end, we focus on
two very distinct types of information: scientific and con-
spiracy news. The former are aiming at diffusing scientific
knowledge as well as scientific thinking, while the latter pro-
vide alternative arguments that are difficult to substantiate.
Conspiracists tend to reduce the complexity of reality by
explaining significant social or political occurrences as plots
conceived by powerful individuals or organizations. Since
these kinds of arguments can sometimes involve the rejection
of science, alternative explanations are invoked to replace
the scientific evidence [25]. For instance, people who reject
the link between HIV and AIDS generally believe that AIDS
was created by the U.S. Government to control the African
American population [26, 27]. Just recently, the fear of an
Ebola outbreak in the United States rippled through social
media networks [28–30]. Furthermore, the spread of mis-
information can be particularly difficult to correct [31–34].
In fact, recently, in [35] it has been shown that conspiracist
and mainstream information reverberate in a similar way on
social media and that users generally exposed to conspiracy
stories are the more prone to like and share satirical infor-
mation [36]. Meanwhile, scientific debunking on conspiracy
rumors creates a reinforcement effect in consuming conspir-
acist information on polarized users [34].
Virality of unsubstantiated rumors. In this work, we
analyze a sample of 1.2M Facebook Italian users consuming
different (and opposite) kind of information: scientific and
conspiracy news. We observe that users engagement across
different contents correlates with the number of friends hav-
ing similar consumption patterns (homophily). Then, we fo-
cus on the popularity of posts of the two categories, finding
that both present similar statistical signatures. Finally, we
test this diffusion patterns on an external sample of 4,709
intentional false information – satirical version and para-
doxical claims – confirming that neither hubs (structural
properties) nor the most active users (influencers) are rele-
vant to characterize viral phenomena. Our analysis shows
that where misinformation is pervasive, users’ aggregation
around shared beliefs makes the frequent exposure to con-
spiracy stories (polarization) a determinant for the viral-
ity of false information. Furthermore, we provide impor-
tant insights toward the understanding of viral processes
around false information on online social media. In partic-
ular, through the relation between the users’ engagement
and the number of friends, we provide new metrics – i.e.,
users polarization defined on the information consumption
patterns – to detect areas in the social network where false
claims are more likely to spread. We conclude the paper
showing a nice case study about the role of the frequent ex-
posure to conspiracy stories (polarization) on the virality of
false information.
2. RELATEDWORKS
Recent studies explored the evolution of social phenomena
on online social networks from observable data; one of the
most investigated aspects are the structural properties and
their effect on social dynamics [10, 37, 38]. The strength of
weak ties is currently matter of debate. In fact, in [38] it
is shown that while long ties are relevant in the spreading
of innovation and social movements, they are not enough
to spread social reinforcement. In [10] the author found
evidence of an effect of reinforcement in the adoption for
clustered networks, where many redundant ties are present.
In a more recent work [37], the number of different con-
nected components, representing separate social contexts for
the user, proved to be more influential than the number of
friends itself and other properties of potential influencers
have been addressed in [39]. Another interesting challenge is
the one studying the possibility to distinguish influence from
homophily [40–42]. In [40] it is performed over the global
network of instant messaging traffic among about 30 millions
users on Yahoo.com, with complete data on the adoption of
a mobile service application and precise dynamic behavioral
data on users. The effect of homophily proves to explain
more than 50% of the phenomena perceived as contagion.
In [41] the role of social network and exposure to friends’
activities in information re-sharing on Facebook is analyzed.
Through controlled experiments in which user were divided
in exposed and not exposed to friends’ re-sharing, authors
were able to isolate contagion from other confounding effects
like homophily. They claimed that in the exposed case there
is a considerably higher chance to share contents.
Recent studies settled on Facebook aimed at unfolding cas-
cades characteristics [18] and predicting their trajectories
and shapes [43]. As for the characteristics, it is found that a
small but significant fraction of posts forms wide and deep
cascades and that different cascades may evolve in differ-
ent ways. Many aspects of cascades’ behavior – e.g., under
which structural and user-constrained properties is possi-
ble to predict them – are hard tasks that have not been
completely exploited. In the last years, a new online phe-
nomenon is attracting the interest of the researchers com-
munity, the spreading of unsubstantiated and false claims
through OSN (as Facebook), that often reverberate lead-
ing to mass misinformation. The study in [35] is a de-
tailed analysis of the information consumption by Facebook
users on different categories of pages: alternative informa-
tion sources, political activism and mainstream media. Au-
thors pointed out evidences that mainstream media informa-
tion reverberate as long as unsubstantiated one, and that the
exposition to the latter makes users more likely to interact
with intentionally injected false information. More recently,
in [34] it has been shown that the exposure to debunking
posts might increase the engagement of users in consuming
conspiracy information.
3. DATA COLLECTION
In this work, we aim at testing the relationship of content
consumption with respect to social networks’ structure and
viral phenomena. To do this, we need to clearly identify
sources that are promoting different contents referring to op-
posite worldviews. We define the space of our investigation
with the help of Facebook groups very active in the debunk-
ing of conspiracy theses (see the acknowledgements section
for further details). We started from 73 public Facebook
pages, from which 34 are about scientific news and 39 about
news that can be considered conspiratorial; we refer to the
former as science pages and to the latter as conspiracy pages.
In Table 1 we summarize the details of our data collection.
We downloaded all posts from these pages in a timespan of
4 years (2010 to 2014). In addition, we collected all the likes
and comments from the posts, and we counted the number
of shares1. In total, we collected around 9M likes and 1M
comments, performed by about 1.2M and 280K Facebook
users, respectively (see Table 1). Likes, shares, and com-
ments have a different meaning from the user viewpoint.
Most of the times, a like stands for a positive feedback to
the post; a share expresses the will to increase the visibility
of a given information; and a comment is the way in which
online collective debates take form. Comments may contain
negative or positive feedbacks with respect to the post.
In addition, we collected the ego networks of users who liked
at least one post on science or conspiracy pages2, that is,
for each of these users we collected the list of friends and
the links between them. This allowed us to create a social
network of users and the (publicly declared) connections be-
tween them for a total of about 1.2M nodes and 34.5M
edges.
Total Science Conspiracy
Pages 73 34 39
Posts 271,296 62,705 208,591
Likes 9,164,781 2,505,399 6,659,382
Comments 1,017,509 180,918 836,591
Shares 17,797,819 1,471,088 16,326,731
Likers 1,196,404 332,357 864,047
Commenters 279,972 53,438 226,534
Table 1: Breakdown of Facebook dataset. The
number of pages, posts, likes, comments, and shares
for science and conspiracy pages.
Finally, we obtained access to 4,709 posts from two satiri-
cal Facebook pages (to which we will refer to as troll posts
and troll pages) promoting intentionally false and caricatu-
ral version of the most debated issues. The more popular of
the two is called called“Semplicemente Me”, it is followed by
about 7K users and it is focused on general online rumors.
The second one is called “Simply Humans”, it is followed by
about 1K users, and it hosts mostly posts of conspiratorial
nature. We collected about 40K likes and 59K comments
on these posts, performed by about 16K and 43K Facebook
users, respectively. These pages were able to trigger sev-
eral viral phenomena, with one of them reaching more than
100K shares. In Section 7, we use troll memes to measure
how the social ecosystem under investigation is responding
to the injection of false information.
4. PRELIMINARIES AND DEFINITIONS
Here we describe how we preprocess our dataset and provide
some of the basic definitions that we use throughout the en-
tire paper. Let P be the set of all the posts in our collection,
1Unfortunately, although Facebook provides this number for
a given post, it provides the IDs of only a small number of
the sharers.
2We used publicly available data, so we collected only data
for which the users had the corresponding permissions open.
We estimated that these form a percentage of more than 96%
of the total connections, allowing us to perform a meaningful
analysis regarding the connections between users.
and define Pscience (Pconsp) as the set of posts posted on one
of the 34 (39) Facebook pages about science (conspiracy)
news. We call posts that were posted in pages about sci-
ence, science posts, and similarly for conspiracy posts. Let
V be the set of all the 1.2M users that we observed and E
the set of edges representing the Facebook friendship con-
nections between them. These define a graph G = (V,E).
We also define the graph of likes, GL = (V L,EL), which is
the subgraph of G composed of users who have liked at least
one post. Thus, V L is the set of users of V who have liked
at least one post, and we set EL = {(u,v) ∈ E; u,v ∈ V L}.
For each user u let θ(u) be the total number of likes that u
has expressed in posts in our collection P. We define ψ(u)
and call it the engagement of user u as the normalized lik-
ing activity with respect to of all the users in our dataset,
namely ψ(u) = θ(u)
maxv θ(v)
. We are interested in learning the
extent to which users are polarized in a given content. Fol-
lowing previous works [34–36], we are interested in studying
the polarization of users, which we informally define as the
tendency of users to interact about only with a single type of
information. Here we study the polarization towards science
and conspiracy. To quantify it, we define the polarization of
user u ∈ V L, ρ(u) ∈ [0,1], as the ratio of likes that u has per-
formed on conspiracy posts: assuming that u has performed
x and y likes on science and conspiracy posts, respectively,
we let ρ(u) = y/(x+ y). Thus, a user u for whom ρ(u) = 0
is polarized towards science, whereas a user with ρ(u) = 1
is polarized towards conspiracy. Note that we use the liking
activity to define polarization and we ignore the comment-
ing activity. The former is usually an explicit endorsement
of the original post, whereas a comment may be an endorse-
ment, a criticism, or even a response to a previous comment.
In Figure 1 we depict the polarization of all the users in V L.
On the left panel, we show the probability density func-
tion (PDF). Recall that value ρ(u) = 0 corresponds to users
who have liked only science posts and value ρ(u) = 1 to
users who have liked only conspiracy posts. From the plots
it is evident that the vast majority of the users are polar-
ized either towards science or towards conspiracy. Moreover,
the quantile–quantile comparison shows that distributions of
the number of likes for users totally polarized towards sci-
ence and conspiracy – i.e, the distributions of the values
{ψ(u); ρ(u) = 0} and {ψ(u); ρ(u) = 1} – are very similar.
To further details on the interaction between users on the
two categories refer to [36]. Findings depicted in Figure 1
suggest that most of the likers can be divided into two sets,
those polarized towards science and those polarized towards
conspiracy news. Let V Lscience be the users with polarization
more than 95% towards science (i.e., less than 5% towards
conspiracy), formally:
V Lscience = {u ∈ V L; ρ(u) < 0.05},
and V Lscience the users with polarization more than 95% to-
wards conspiracy, namely
V Lconsp = {u ∈ V L; ρ(u) > 0.95}.
For convenience, we call the first set of users science users
and the second one conspiracy users, without implying that
the former are scientists or that the latter necessarily believe
in conspiracy theories. Note that these two sets contain
Figure 1: Polarization on contents. Probability den-
sity function (PDF) of users’ polarization across
posts and quantile–quantile comparison (QQ plot)
between the distributions of the values {ψ(u); ρ(u) =
0} and {ψ(u); ρ(u) = 1}.
most of the users in the peaks in Figure 1. We also ex-
perimented with values ranging from 50% to 99%, and the
results were qualitatively the same. We can then define the
induced subgraphs of G, GLscience = (V
L
science,E
L
science) and
GLconsp = (V
L
consp,E
L
consp) in the natural way, for example,
ELscience contains all the edges in E such that both endpoints
are in V Lscience. In Section 6 we study those two graphs ex-
tensively.
We also define some of the graph-theoretic terms that we
use throughout the paper. In general, nodes in the graphs
represent the Facebook users of our study. For convenience,
we use the terms node and user interchangeably. We assume
that a graph to which we refer is clear from the context. The
degree of node u, deg(u), is the number of neighbors of node
u. The clustering coefficient of u is the number of closed
triplets over the total number of triplets (we use the time-
efficiently method). The k-core of a graph H is the maximal
subgraph H ′ of H such that the degree of each node in H ′ is
at least k. The coreness of a vertex is k if it belongs to the
k-core but not to the (k + 1)-core. The density of a graph
with x nodes and y edges is y/
(
x
2
)
: the ratio of the number
of existing edges over all the possible edges.
Finally, we introduce some statistical notions that we use in
Section 5 to analyze how science and conspiracy information
is consumed. Let us define a random variable T on the inter-
val [0,∞), indicaticating the time an event takes place (we
will use it to represent the time elapsed from the time a post
was posted till a given user liked it). The cumulative dis-
tribution function (CDF), F (t) = Pr(T ≤ t), indicates the
probability that the event takes place within a given time t.
The survival function, defined as the complementary CDF
(CCDF)3 of T , gives the probability that an event lasts be-
yond a given time period t. To estimate this probability we
use the Kaplan–Meier estimate [44]. Let nt denote the num-
ber of posts being liked before a given time step t, and let
dt denote the number of posts stop being liked at t. Then,
the estimated survival probability after time t is defined as
(nt − dt)/nt. Then, if we have N observations at times
t1 ≤ t2 ≤ · · · ≤ tN , assuming that the events at times ti are
jointly independent, the Kaplan–Meier estimate of the sur-
vival function at time t is defined as Sˆ(t) =
∏
ti<t
(
nti−dti
nti
).
5. USERS AND CONTENTS
In this section, we study how users consume information
from science and conspiracy pages. Figure 2 shows the
empirical complementary cumulative distribution function
(CCDF) of the number of likes, comments, and shares of
posts in Pscience and Pconsp. Now, we concentrate on the
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Figure 2: Consumption Patterns. Empirical
Complementary Cumulative Distribution Function
(CCDF) for the number of likes, comments, and
shares of Pscience and Pconsp.
users and we measure how the science and conspiracy users
(i.e., users in V Lscience and V
L
consp) keep on consuming infor-
mation in Pscience and Pconsp over time. Figure 3 shows
the empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF) for
the lifetime of V Lscience and V
L
consp on posts in Pscience and
Pconsp, respectively. The lifetime of a user u ∈ V Lscience is
the difference of the post time of the last and first post in
Pscience that she liked, and similarly for the lifetime of users
in V Lconsp. Finally, we put our attention on the lifetime of
Pscience and Pconsp by computing their empirical Survival
Function. Figure 4 shows the Kaplan–Meier estimate and
95% confidence intervals for the Survival Function of Pscience
and Pconsp. Despite the very different kind of content, the
results indicate that consumption patterns (number of likes,
comments, and shares), as well as persistence of users and
3We remind that the CCDF of a random variable X is one
minus the CDF, the function f(x) = Pr(X > x).
Figure 3: Users’ Lifetime. Empirical Cumulative
Distribution Function (CDF) for the temporal dis-
tance between the first and last like of users in
V Lscience and V
L
consp on posts in Pscience and Pconsp,
respectively; see text for more details.
Figure 4: Posts’ Lifetime. Kaplan–Meier estimate
and 95% confidence intervals for the Survival Func-
tion of Pscience and Pconsp.
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Figure 5: Network metrics. Complementary Cu-
mulative Distribution Function (CCDF) of the de-
gree of each node, the size of the connected compo-
nents, and the coreness of each node of the graphs G
(all), GLscience (scientific news), and G
L
consp (conspir-
acy news). All graphs present similar distributions.
posts over time, both categories have similar consumption
patterns.
6. CONTENTS AND FRIENDS
In this section, we analyze the topological features of the
social networks by accounting for users’ information con-
sumption patterns. As a first measure, in Figure 5, we
show the complementary cumulative distribution function
(CCDF) of the degree of each node, the size of the con-
nected components, and the coreness of each node for the
graphs G, GLscience, and G
L
consp. All graphs present simi-
lar distributions. Next we compare the network structure
of the entire graph G, and the subgraphs of the polarized
users, GLscience and G
L
consp, when we restrict to different lev-
els of engagement. In Figure 6 we show various topological
metrics for subgraphs of the three aforementioned graphs.
In the x-axis we vary the engagement of nodes and consider
the subgraphs of G, GLscience, and G
L
consp induced by nodes
u with engagement ψ(u) ≥ x. In the y-axis we consider a
variety of topological measures: size (number of nodes), den-
sity, clustering coefficient, number of connected components,
size of the maximum connected component, and maximum
coreness over all the nodes in the subgraph. The results
show that the more we consider active users the more the
connectivity patterns move towards a denser and clustered
network.
The liking activity is a good approximation to associate
users with their preferred contents [34–36], so users’ liking
activity across contents of the different categories may be
intended as the preferential attitude towards the one or the
other type of information. To see how consumers of different
contents are distributed over the network, we measure how
the polarization of the network changes along with the users’
engagement. In Figure 7, we show the average value of ρ(u)
as a function of their ψ(u): for each value of x, we consider
the subnetwork of G induced by users u with ψ(u) ≥ x and
we compute the average polarization among the users u in
the entire subnetwork, in the maximal k-core, and in the
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Figure 6: Network topology and users engagement.
Size (number of nodes), density, clustering coef-
ficient, number of connected components, size of
the maximum connected component, and maximum
coreness over all the nodes in the subgraph induced
by nodes of engagement ψ(u) ≥ x.
maximal connected component.
We can observe in Figure 7 that the lowest value of the
polarization in the largest connected components is attained
at ψ(u) = 0.025. Given this observation, in Figure 8, we
show the largest connected component of the subnetwork
induced by the friendship network G if we only consider
nodes u ∈ G with ψ(u) > 0.025, where the color of each
node u depends on ρ(u) (red nodes are science users and
blue are conspiracy ones). We identify a main community
of polarized users in conspiracy news.
Figure 8 hints that there is a strong presence of homophily
with respect to polarization, and we delve more into this
issue. In Figure 9 we show the fraction of polarized friends
as a function of the engagement degree ψ(·). Specifically, in
the left panel, we consider the set of each user u ∈ V Lscience
with a given ψ(u), we compute the fraction of u’s polarized
neighbors in G that are polarized towards science (i.e., they
belong in V Lscience), and we show the average of these frac-
tions for all of these users u. In the right panel, we do the
same, but considering the conspiracy users u ∈ V Lconsp and
their conspiracy friends. Figure 9 clearly indicates the pres-
ence of homophily in the friendship network with respect
to news preference. This is an important phenomenon to
understand viral processes, because the latter might diffuse
among connected users having similar information consump-
tion patterns; we study this question more in Section 7.
To further confirm such point, we show that for a polar-
ized user u, the fraction of polarized friends in her cate-
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Figure 7: Users Engagement and Network. For each
value of x, we consider the subnetwork of G induced
by users u with ψ(u) ≥ x and we compute the average
polarization among the users u in the entire subnet-
work, in the maximal k-core, and in the maximal
connected component.
Figure 8: Largest connected component. Maximal
connected component of the friendship network for
nodes u with ψ(u) > 0.025, where nodes are colored
according to the polarization ψ(u).
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Figure 9: Fraction of polarized neighbors as a func-
tion of ψ(·).
gory y(u) can be predicted by means of a linear regression
model with intercept where the explanatory variable is a
logarithmic transformation of the number of likes θ(u), that
is, y(u) = β0 +β1 log(θ(u)). Coefficients are estimated using
ordinary least squares and they are—with the corresponding
standard errors inside the round brackets—βˆ0 = 0.70 (0.005)
and βˆ1 = 0.043 (0.001), with R
2 = 0.95, for users polar-
ized towards science, and βˆ0 = 0.71 (0.003) and βˆ1 = 0.047
(0.0006), with R2 = 0.98, for users polarized towards con-
spiracy. All the p-values are close to zero. In Figure 10, we
show the fit of the model for users polarized in science and
conspiracy.
Summarizing, we find very polarized communities around
different contents. Such a polarization emerges in the friend-
ship network where we identify homophily; indeed, the more
a polarized user is active in her category the bigger the num-
ber of polarized friends she has in the same category. Thanks
to such a characterization, we are able to identify areas of
the social network where a given content is more likely to
diffuse. This is the topic of the next section.
7. VIRALITY AND POLARIZATION
In this section, we want to analyze the determinants behind
viral phenomena related to false information. In particu-
lar, we focus on the role of structural features of the social
network as well as on users’ consumption patterns.
7.1 Network Structure and Users’ Activity
For a better understanding of posts’ virality, we use the num-
ber of shares since they are a proxy of the number of people
reached by a post. Hence, we pick two random samples of
5,000 posts from each set Pscience and Pconsp, and we com-
pute structural as well as information-consumption metrics
to be compared with the total number of shares. In particu-
lar, we concentrate on the degree deg(u) and liking activity
ψ(u) of each user u who liked the posts in our samples.
In figures 11 and 12 we show the number of shares versus,
respectively, the average values of the degree deg(u) and lik-
ing activity ψ(u) among the users who liked a given post
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Figure 10: Predicting the number of polarized
friends. For a polarized user u, the fraction of
polarized friends in her category y(u) can be pre-
dicted by means of a linear regression model with
intercept where the explanatory variable is a loga-
rithmic transformation of the number of likes θ(u),
that is, y(u) = β0 + β1 log(θ(u)). Coefficients are esti-
mated using ordinary least squares and they are—
with the corresponding standard errors inside the
round brackets—βˆ0 = 0.70 (0.005) and βˆ1 = 0.043
(0.001), with R2 = 0.95, for users polarized towards
science, and βˆ0 = 0.71 (0.003) and βˆ1 = 0.047 (0.0006),
with R2 = 0.98, for users polarized towards conspir-
acy. All the p-values are close to zero.
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Figure 11: Number of shares versus average degree
of users who liked the posts in our samples.
from our samples. The results provide an outline of viral
processes. They show that in viral posts (i.e., posts with
high values of shares), very active users (in terms either of
number of friends or liking activity) form a tiny fraction of
the overall users. We have checked that similar results hold
when accounting for commenting activity.
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Figure 12: Number of shares versus average liking
activity of users who liked the posts in our samples.
Since the distributions of both degree and liking activity are
heavy tailed, large volumes of users that make a post viral
are mainly composed of users with low degree and liking
activity.
7.2 Viral Processes on False Information
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Figure 13: Number of shares versus average degree
and average liking activity of users who liked troll
posts.
Users’ preference towards information belonging to a par-
ticular kind of narrative might provide interesting insights
with respect to the determinants of viral phenomena. Un-
der the light of the findings in the previous section, we now
focus on how false information can spread in Facebook. We
use the set of 4,709 troll posts described in Section 3 and
we study the virality of each post with respect to the net-
work structure and users’ liking activity. Notice that such a
set of posts is disjoint from the one used to classify users as
polarized towards science or conspiracy, thus we can obtain
unbiased results regarding the effect of users’ polarization in
the diffusion of false information. Figure 13 shows the same
information of figures 11 and 12 but for troll posts. Again,
in viral posts, very active users (in terms either of number of
friends or liking activity) form a tiny fraction of the overall
users. However, we found an interesting fact: in most of
the viral posts users are highly polarized. In Figure 14, for
each troll post, we show polarization ρ(·) of users who liked
it against its number of shares. Whereas users’ both degree
and liking activity become low as the number of shares in-
creases, polarization ρ(u) is relevant for all levels of shares.
In Figure 15 we show the average value of the polarization
for increasing levels of the number of shares. More precisely,
for each level of virality x, we compute the average polariza-
tion of all users who liked troll posts with number of shares
at least x. As we can see, the curve has an increasing trend
that asymptotically stabilizes around 0.76. The plot indi-
cates that for posts containing false claims with more than
100 shares, the average polarization of the users who liked it
is high and remains constant with the increase (at different
orders of magnitude) of the virality.
To better shape the role the polarization ρ(·) in viral phe-
nomena around false information, we study how it changes
by considering posts with increasing levels of virality. In
Figure 16 we show the PDF of users’ average polarization
for different levels of virality. We observe that for highly
viral posts (with false information) the average polarization
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Figure 14: Polarization on troll posts. The average
polarization versus the number of shares for troll
posts.
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Figure 15: Average polarization of users who liked
troll posts for increasing values of the number of
shares.
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Figure 16: PDF of the average polarization for dif-
ferent levels of virality.
value of the users who like them peaks around 0.8.
Observe that the pick increases with virality of posts. indi-
cation that high polarization is most of the times essential
for a post becoming viral. The results indicate that a good
indicator to detect viral phenomena around false informa-
tion is the users’ polarization. The diffusion of false claims
proliferates within (tightly clustered) users that are usually
exposed to unsubstantiated rumors.
7.3 Case Study
Let us now obtain some more intuition by studying in more
detail the most viral troll posts [45–47]. In Figure 17 we
show the probability density function of the polarization of
the users that liked each of the three troll posts. The most
viral post with 132K shares says that in the year of the
post (2013), after 5,467 years, the month of October has 5
Tuesdays, Wednesdays, and Thursdays, and that this is a
very rare event so that Chinese people call it year of the
glory shu tan tzu. The fact that October 2013 has 5 Tues-
days, Wednesdays, and Thursdays is true, however the rest
is false: this happens around once every seven years and
the phrase has no sense in Chinese. The second one is the
popular case of Senator Cirenga mentioned in the introduc-
tion, which received more than 36K shares. The third one
has a more political taste by stating that the former Italian
speaker of the house received a large sum of money after his
resignation. This post was shared 28K times. In Figure 17
we show the PDF of users’ polarization liking these three
posts. We can see that in all three posts there is a signifi-
cant proportion of conspiracy users, who have seen the post
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Figure 17: PDF of the polarization of the users who
liked one of the three most viral troll posts.
through a viral process (note that the total subscribers to
the Facebook group pages are upper bounded by about only
8K, and we expect a much smaller proportion to have seen
the posts in their Facebook feeds). Interestingly, there is al-
ways a no-negligible number of science users who have also
liked the posts, even though they are from four to ten times
less.
Actually, we can observe that the percentage of science users
depends directly on the content of the post: the more to-
wards conspiracy a post is, the less the ratio of science users.
To provide a better outline of this phenomenon we also plot
in Figure 18 the two most viral posts [48, 49] from the troll
page that is more specific in teasing conspiracy stories (see
Section 3). The first post mentions that a Chinese engineer
discovered an eco-friendly (uranium-based) lamp that pro-
duces extremely bright light at an extremely low cost (order
of pennies) while being able to several hundred years. The
second one is a version of the chemtrail conspiracy theory,
mentioning, among others, that one of the ingredients with
which we are bing sprayed is sildenafil citrate—the active
ingredient of Viagra. Note that in those ones the liking ac-
tivity of science users is very close to zero.
8. CONCLUSIONS
Nowadays, understanding the determinants of viral phenom-
ena occurring on socio-technical systems is a very interest-
ing challenge. The free circulation of contents has changed
the way people get informed, and the quality of informa-
tion plays a fundamental role in collective debates. In this
work, we addressed the relationships between the virality
of false claims and the users information consumption pat-
terns. To do this, we analyze a sample of 1.2M Facebook
Italian users consuming different (and opposite) types of
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Figure 18: PDF of the polarization of the users who
liked one of the two most viral conspiracy-like troll
posts.
information—science and conspiracy news. We found out
that users engagement across different contents correlates
with the number of friends having similar consumption pat-
terns (homophily). Next, we studied the virality of posts
of the two categories, finding that both present similar sta-
tistical signatures. Finally, we tested diffusion patterns on
an external set of 4,709 intentionally satirical false posts
(troll posts) and we discovered that neither the presence of
hubs (structural properties) nor the most active users (in-
fluencers) are prevalent in viral phenomena. The results
of this work provide important insights towards the under-
standing of viral processes around false information on on-
line social media. In particular, we provide a new metric—
user polarization defined on the information consumption
patterns—which along with users’ engagement and the num-
ber of friends helps in the discovery of where in the social
network false claims are more likely to spread. In addition,
we show that users’ aggregation around shared beliefs makes
the frequent exposure to conspiracy stories (polarization) a
determinant for the virality of false information.
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